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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT A. CECIL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-V-
LaVERA C. c·ECIL, ELIZA C. BUT-
TERFIELD, as Guardian of the person 
of La Vera C. Cecil, and WALKER 
BANK & TRUST COMPANY, a cor-
poration, as Guardian of the Estate of 
La Vera C. Cecil, an Incompetent, 
Defendants ,a;n,d Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
9229 
ON PE'TITION FOR REHEARING 
ROMNEY, BOYER and RONNOW 
Attorneys for Plaintiff .and 
Respondent 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT A. CECIL, 
Plwintiff and Respondent, 
-v-
La VERA C. CECIL, ELIZA C. BUT-
TERFIELD, as Guardian of the person 
of La Vera C. Cecil, and WALKER 
BANK & TRUST COMPANY, a cor-
poration, as Guardian of the Estate of 
La Vera C. Cecil, an Incompetent, 
Defendants .avnd AppBllants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
9229 
ON PEITITION FOR REHEARING 
COMES NOW, ALBERT A. CE·CIL, respondent 
herein, and respectfully moves the Court for a rehearing 
in the case upon the grounds set forth herein. 
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STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
The facts in the case have been rather completely 
set forth in the original briefs of the parties and in the 
opinion of the Court filed October 27, 1960. Any new 
facts alluded to herein will be stated in connection with 
the argument. 
STATEMENT OF POINT RELIED ON 
POINT l 
THE MARRIAGE O·F LaVERA C. CECIL TO DARWIN 
C. RICHAR.DSO·N IS A CHANGED CIRUMSTANCE REQUIR-
ING MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE TO 
RELIEVE RE8PONDEN'T FROM THE OBLIGATION TO 
PAY ALIMONY. 
ARGlJMENT 
POINT I 
THE MARRIAGE OF LaVERA C. CECIL To· DARWIN 
C. RICHARDSON IS A CHANGED CIRUMSTANCE REQUIRr 
lNG MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE TO 
RELIEVE RESPONDENT FRO·M THE OBLIGATION TO 
PAY ALIMO:NY. 
In its opinion rendered herein the Court has held 
there was not a sufficient showing of ''changed circum-
stances'' to justify the modification of the divorce decree. 
This point was not tried to the Court belo'v nor did it 
appear in the briefs or arguments on appeal. But if 
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the point 1nay be considered as being implicit in the 
case as it is now before the Court, we respectfully submit 
the ·Court's conclusion in regard to said "changed cir-
ctunstances" is against the weight of judicial authority 
and does not rest on sound principle. We believe that 
~hanged circumstances clearly obtain in the case, as 
'vill be shown herein. 
Apparently the compelling reason for the Court's 
decision is its desire to preserve a right of support for 
l\Irs. Cecil, for on page 2 of the "green sheet'' appears 
the following: 
"The courts appear to have been greatly 
influenced by a p·ublic policy of insuring to a 
wife a legal right to support." 
Public policy does not demand, nor is it the obliga-
tion of this Court, to preserve for La Vera C. Cecil that 
which she voluntarily abandoned and renounced. She 
entered into a marriage with Richardson and thereby 
under the law set down by this Court in Aust.ad v. Austad, 
2 Ut. 2, 49, 269 P 2d 284, legally renounced her right 
of support from Respondent, and clearly acquired a 
right of support from Richar.dson. The record is clear 
that Mrs. Cecil, prior to the marriage, reviewed the 
financial status of Richardson, his work record and 
his pension (R. 51, 52). It must be remembered that 
the Trial Court in this case made a finding of fact that 
La Vera ·C. Cecil was mentally competent to enter into 
the marriage with Richardson (R. 100), and in this 
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finding we are persuaded this Court concurs. Thus, 
by 1narrying Richardson, she made an intelligent and 
affirmative election to look to him rather than to Re-
sp·ondent for support, both as a matter of fact and as. 
a legal result. This is not a ease where the wife acquired 
no right to support from the second husband because 
the marriage was void or was "no valid marriage" as 
the opinion recites. This marriage was at worst only 
voidable, not void, as shown at pages 10 and 11 in our 
original brief on appeal. And as indicated in the Court's 
opinion on page one of the ''green sheet" and as testified 
to by her counsel, l\fr. Richards (R. 82) she could have 
obtained a divorce from Richardson. 
Clearly, the right to obtain a divorce includes a 
claim for support; and in1plicit in a divorce situation 
is the concept that the marriage was not a void one, 
merely voidable. 
Under facts as here the Courts in well considered 
cases have refused to revive an obligation of alimony 
or support against the former husband under the con-
cept that it is the voluntary act of the wife, affirmatively 
choosing the new husband as her source of support and 
entering into the marriage ceremony "\Yith him, and not 
whether the marriage so chosen turns out to be good, 
bad or indifferent as to economics or actual validity. 
This is particularly true where, as here, the alimony 
award 'vas based upon a property settlement or separa-
tion agreement. 
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Thus in Sefton v. Sefton, 279 P 2d 576, a California 
case: 
"It is the fact of the ceremonial re1narriage 
that is in the minds of the parties and causes 
the payments to cease under the property settle-
ment agreement. An annulment of the remarriage 
by thewife can not give new life to the husband's 
obligation which has terminated by the remarri-
age. In some cases it is months or even years 
'1t re<Asonllbh before an annulment of the remarriage is sought ~y the wife.,e&It nob givQ llQ\61 life tc• 1he h,shzuuFs 
c,.-l f~Ntt -fbe husband's obligation of support under such an 
agreement can be reinstated at the whim of the 
wife and at a time to be set by her~" 
and in the case of Gaines v. Ja.cobsen, 308 N.Y. 218, 
124 NE 2d 290, the court said : 
"It was certainly unlikely that the parties 
intended the result to turn upon whether an un-
successful remarriage was deemed in law void, 
as the present one, or voidable and valid until 
dissolved by a decree of divorce, but that the 
understanding must have been that, upon the 
wife's remarriage, the husband could regard him-
self as free of the duty to support her. The fact 
that the wife, because of the death of her second 
husband, was no longer in a position to obtain 
alimony from him was held immaterial, since 
the wife could not retain both husbands as sources 
of support, and, havnig made her choice, was 
bound by it." 
''Having remarried, she chose to abandon he.r 
right to support from defendant i·n fravor of Bar-
ragan. Plaintiff could not retain both husbands 
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as sources of support; having made her choice 
she is bound by ~t; although subsequent events 
proved it to have been an improvident one." 
(emphasis ours) 
These two cases involve agreements of the parties 
adopted by the Court in the divorce decree, as in the 
instant case. The agreements in the two cases contained 
wording that alimony would cease upon remarriage of 
the wife which the agreement of the instant case does 
not contain, but the effect is the same: 48 A.L.R. 2 p. 
322 Sec. 6(a): 
"While there is but little direct authority in 
point, the cases as a whole support the view that, 
unless a contrary intention is expressed in the 
agreement, the wife's remarriage terminates the 
husband's obligation to support her, under a 
separation agreement which is silent on the ques-
tion of the wife's re-marrtage." (emphasis ours) 
and the point is e1nphasized in the case of Spatz v Spatz, 
171 N.Y.S. 2nd 157, 1958, in a situation \Yhere the pro-
VISion regarding remarriage was 01nitted; the Court 
said: 
''It is true that the \Vord "remarriage" is 
omitted physically from the provisions of para-
graph "3. (a)" of the separation agreement made 
November 25, 1949 by the parties hereto. Ad-
mittedly, the aforesaid agreement could have been 
more precise in its ter1ninology. Nevertheless, in 
the ~Court's opinion, not only the provisions of 
law but the public policy of the State are in-
herent parts of and are read into any agreement 
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1nade in this forum. It is a fact that, upon p·roof 
of a wife's remarriage, the Court must modify 
the judgment by deleting the provisions for the 
wife's supp·ort.'' 
Two very recent cases on the general point con-
tended for herein by Respondent are Spatz v. Spatz, 
supra, and Gevis v. Gevis, 147 N. Y. S. 2d 489, 1955. 
Spatz in holding that the annulment of a subsequent 
marriage by the wife did not revive former husband's 
obligation to pay alimony under a settlement agreement, 
said: 
"The law does not countenance support for 
a spouse from two persons, each of whom, so 
far as the economic status is concerned may be 
deemed in the category of "husbands". 
"Plaintiff-wife having remarried, must be 
held to have looked exclusively to her new hus-
band Lerman for whatever support and mainten-
ance she was entitled to. She could not, by that 
fact, ''lay the financial and economic provisions 
of the separation at repose," for the "duration 
of the new marriage" ; and if the remarriage were 
unsuccessful for any reason whatsoever or were 
otherwise abrogated, to then bring out of the 
mothballs and revive the agreement to support 
a former wife." 
''It must not be overlooked that in the instant 
case the parties' marital status was abrogated by 
a decree of divorce, and no one could validly 
claim that the instant agreement would b~e revived 
if the plaintiff's remarriage had ended in a 
divorce rather than in an annulment." (emphasis 
ours) 
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In the Gevis case cited above, the 'vife's second 
marriage was annulled on grounds of her misrepresenta-
tion, and she sought to revive former husband's alimony 
pay1nents. The court said: 
"The question presented is whether, in the 
circumstances here, plaintiff may rely to any 
extent upon the principle that the declaration of 
invalidity of a voidable marriage serves to re-
vive the obligation of the defendant under the 
decree of divorce as though the second marriage 
never existed." 
The Court, in holding that she could not reVIve 
the obligation of the former husband, said: 
"Not alone is defendant a stranger to the 
controversy resulting in the annulment, but plain-
tiff by her own act contributed to the decree 
which destroyed her second marriage. It was by 
her own fault that the marriage, \vhich relieved 
defendant of his obligation, was effaced. Defend-
ant was still a stranger to the controversy when 
he remarried, and it is likewise by her own fault 
that plaintiff seeks. now to cast upon defendant 
a burden larger than fixed by the decree of 
divorce. Injustice would arise if the rescission 
were now used to change the quality of defend-
ant's act of remarriage done in reliance upon 
the decree of divorce and plaintiff's remarriage." 
The ·Court quoted from Gaines v. Jacobsen, supra: 
"It makes neither sense nor reason nor is it 
good p·olicy that the husband should stand ever 
ready to support the wife, insuring her mainten-
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ance should she, with full knowledge of the facts, 
but confused or Inisled by the vagaries of matri.;. 
monial law, discard or be discarded by a second 
husband because of legal infirmities in the re-
marriage." 
and said finally: 
"It would seem to follow, therefore, that 
plaintiff's remarriage was voidable by her own 
act and knowledge and she ought not to be granted 
the benefit of rescission after defendant, a stran-
ger to all the intervening acts, remarried in 
reliance thereon.'' 
Counsel for Appellants will point out that New York 
(the forum of Gev~s and Spatz) has a statute allowing 
for an alimony or support award in annulment cases. 
While this is true the Gevis case clearly was not decided 
on that point because immediately following the last 
statement of the Court in Gevis in the next above in-
dented paragraph, the Court says : 
''There is another ground for refusal of sup-
port under the divorce decree.'' 
and then adverts to the statute. 
A fortiori, in the case at bar where a divorce could 
have been had, such divorce would have supplied to 
LaVera Cecil precisely what the New York statute pro-
vides were she in that jurisdiction. 
The Court in its opinion says "it did not appear 
from the records that he (Richardson) ever supported 
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I I •' I' 
her." We simply cani~P~- ~n ~he absence of record let our 
imaginations supply the fact that Richardson did not, 
or could not, support her. It is clear from the record 
that Mrs. Cecil reviewed the financial condition of Mr. 
Richardson -prior to. mar:rying him, and we must assume 
that she found it f'aVofable; and she is deemed to know 
the effect . of. h~r ~yt,, :which would be that in marrying 
... I:;. I; ; '• J' I'! . 
Richardson sh~: :W~S forsaking and losing the support 
of Cecil. 
The changed circumstances required for an affirma-
tion of the judgment reside in La Vera Cecil's affirmative, 
deliberate and considered act in forsaking Cecil's sup-
port for that of Richardson, by marrying Richardson. 
Thus, as a matter of fact she changed both her and 
Respondent's circumstances and as the law gives her a 
right to support from Richardson, she may not with 
impunity leave Richardson now and turn again to Cecil. 
Her marriage was not void. It has only been annulled 
upon her misrepresentation to the Court that she was 
incompetent, and at most was voidable. 
The Court should render its opinion that the judg-
ment of the Trial Court is affirmed for the reasons set 
forth herein, or, in the alternative, should remand the 
case to the Trial ·Court for additional findings ''ith 
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respect to changed circumstances based upon the record 
or upon further evidence to be taken. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY, BOYER and RONNOW 
Attorneys for Plairntiff .anJ 
Respondent 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake ·City, Utah 
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